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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor David Owen's elegant and comprehensive treatise, Products Liability
Law,' is now available to students, legal scholars, and practicing lawyers. Professor
Owen is one of the leading authorities on American products liability law, and his
treatise is the culmination of more than thirty years of work in this important and
controversial area of the law.2 Products Liability Law packs an enormous amount
of information in one volume. Its over 1,300 pages cover all of the traditional
* Ashland Oil Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968, University of
Florida; LL.M. 1973, Yale University.
1. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (2005) [hereinafter PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW].
2. In addition to his many law review articles, Professor Owen is also the coauthor of a popular
products liability casebook and a highly regarded three-volume treatise on products liability. See DAVID
G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY (4th ed. 2004); DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN
& OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY (3d ed. 2000). In addition, Professor Owen coauthored Products
Liability in a Nutshell (7th ed. 2005) and served as editorial advisor for the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability (1998). The fifth edition of his casebook, Products Liability and Safety, is
scheduled for publication in early 2007.
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aspects of products liability law, as well as new areas of interest such as public
nuisance liability for handgun manufacturers, negligent marketing, and lawsuits
against fast food purveyors. Professor Owen's treatise also provides detailed and
comprehensive coverage of the new Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability (Third Restatement).
Products Liability Law is exceptionally well researched and contains numerous
citations to leading cases, statutes, and legal scholarship on every aspect ofproducts
liability law. The treatise's organization is logical, and the detailed index makes it
easy to find any topic. Products Liability Law's treatment of historical
developments and policy rationales will be especially helpful to anyone interested
in understanding products liability law. All readers will appreciate the fact that
Products Liability Law is completely up-to-date and contains the latest cases,
statutes, and tort reform proposals. In addition, both students and practicing lawyers
will benefit from the treatise's compilation of American and foreign products
liability materials.3
Importantly, Professor Owen's treatise identifies a number of emerging trends
in twenty-first century products liability law. First, Professor Owen describes how
negligence principles have displaced much of strict liability in products liability
law. Products Liability Law also describes liability theories like misrepresentation,
civil conspiracy, the malfunction theory, and negligent marketing, which do not
require the plaintiff to explicitly prove the existence of a product defect. Finally,
Professor Owen's treatise demonstrates how products liability law has become
increasingly "federalized" due to the intrusion of preemption and other federal
constitutional doctrines into this traditional area of state tort law.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
The scope of Products Liability Law is revealed by a journey through its
various chapters. The first chapter is introductory in nature. The rest of the treatise
is divided into five parts. Part I covers the major theories of liability: Chapter 2
discusses negligence, Chapter 3 deals with misrepresentation, Chapter 4 covers
warranty, Chapter 5 is concerned with strict liability in tort. Part I provides a
detailed and comprehensive treatment of modem products liability law's doctrinal
structure and policy rationales.
Part II provides an in-depth discussion of the concept of product defect.
Chapter 6 describes the various forms of product defect and examines proof of
defect issues. It also provides a detailed examination of the Third Restatement's
treatment of the defect requirement. Chapter 7 discusses manufacturing defects,
including "defective" food and drink, while Chapter 8 considers design defects and
the various tests that courts have devised to evaluate product designs, including
special issues of a manufacturer's liability for the design of prescription drugs and
medical devices. Chapter 9 focuses on the duty to warn, including the warning
content and methods of communication. Chapter 9 also identifies limitations on the
3. PRODUCTs LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 8-10.
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duty to warn that apply to sophisticated users, bulk suppliers, and manufacturers of
prescription drugs and medical devices. Chapter 10 addresses a variety of subtle
limitations on the concept of defectiveness, such as obvious and inherent product
dangers and the "state of the art" defense, which limit liability for defective design
and failure to warn.
Part III examines principles of causation. Chapter 11 concentrates on cause-in-
fact, including special causation rules that apply to multiple defendants and failure-
to-warn claims. Chapter 12 addresses proximate cause; it discusses foreseeability
and other tests for proximate cause and addresses the intervening and superseding
cause issues that arise in products liability cases.
Part IV surveys the various defenses to products liability claims. Chapter 13
explores the traditional misconduct defenses such as contributory negligence,
comparative fault, assumption of risk, and product misuse. Chapter 14 considers
more specialized defenses such as the government contractor defense, regulatory
compliance defense, federal preemption, and statutes of limitation and repose.
Part V is devoted to "special issues" in the law of products liability where the
defendant or the transaction deviates from the normal products liability paradigm
involving the manufacturer of a new product sold to a consumer. Chapter 15
discusses the legal issues associated with special types of defendants such as
retailers, suppliers of raw materials and components, parent corporations,
franchisers, successor corporations, and other participants in the marketing process.
Chapter 16 considers recent cases involving special types of transactions and
products such as leases, bailments, and licenses; service transactions; repaired,
rebuilt, and reconditioned products; used products; electricity; real estate; blood;
and communicative products like books, movies, records, and video games. Chapter
17 discusses vexing problems associated with automobile litigation, such as
crashworthiness and apportionment of damages. Finally, Chapter 18 examines in
detail the proper role of punitive damages in products liability law, an area long
recognized as Professor Owen's speciality,4 and analyzes recent legislative and
constitutional reforms that substantially affect this area of law.
4. "Professor David Owen has probably written more of significance about punitive damages than
any other commentator." GERALD W. BOSTON, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN TORT LAW § 2.27, at 46 (1993).
In addition to the extensive discussion in Chapter 18 of his treatise, Professor Owen has written
prolifically in journals on this topic over many years. See, e.g., David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages
Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363 (1994) (analyzing the nature,
functions, criticisms, and reform proposals with regard to punitive damages); David G. Owen, The
Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705 (1989) (analyzing the philosophical
foundations of punitive damages); David G. Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 103 (1982) (analyzing punitive damages in terms of fairness and efficiency); David G. Owen,
Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 103 (1982) (discussing the appropriate use of punitive damages in products liability litigation);
David G. Owen, Crashworthiness Litigation and Punitive Damages, 4 J. PROD. LIAB. 221 (1981)
(discussing the advent of punitive damages in products liability litigation); David G. Owen, Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257 (1976) (analyzing and developing the
doctrine of punitive damages in products liability litigation).
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III. THE RETURN OF NEGLIGENCE
An important recent development that Products Liability Law comprehensively
describes is the shift from strict liability to negligence. In the early days of products
liability, many legal scholars argued that negligence law should be replaced by
strict liability in tort because negligence did not provide sufficient protection to
consumers who were injured by defective products.5 The American Law Institute
(ALl) endorsed this position in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,6 and for more
than three decades, appellate courts steadfastly maintained that liability should be
based on the condition of the product rather than on the conduct of the seller.7 To
maintain the integrity of this strict liability regime, many of these courts attempted
to exclude every aspect of negligence from products liability law.' The courts,
however, eventually were forced to concede that negligence principles could not
be entirely eliminated from failure-to-warn cases.9 The triumph of negligence over
strict liability in this area was finally confirmed by the ThirdRestatement in 1998."°
According to the ThirdRestatement, a product may be considered defective because
of inadequate instructions or warnings "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable
instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor.""
During the last twenty-five years, a few courts also noted that the risk-utility
test that predominated in design defect cases was essentially a negligence-based
5. Fleming James, Jr., General Products--Should Manufacturers BeLiable Without Negligence?,
24 TENN. L. REv. 923, 923 (1957), see William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1117-20 (1960); see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (discussing the need for strict liability to
protect people injured by defective products).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. a, c (1965).
7. E.g., Jackson v. Harsco Corp., 673 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1983) (citing Bradford v. Bendix-
Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co., 517 P.2d 406,413 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973)) ("[T]he focus is upon the
nature of the product,.., rather than on the conduct either of the manufacturer or of the person injured
because of the product."); Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 958 (Md. 1976) (focusing on
the nature of the product rather than the manufacturer's conduct); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 683 P.2d
1097, 1099 (Wash. 1984) (citing Estate of Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 587 P.2d 160, 164
(Wash. 1978); Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 594 P.2d 911,914 (Wash. 1979) (same).
8. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972); Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547, 548 (N.J. 1982); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d
140, 148 (N.J. 1979); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (Pa. 1978).
9. E.g., DiPalma v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 938 F.2d 1463, 1466 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding the
proper standard in duty to warn cases was "the same standard as the duty to warn that is enforceable in
a negligence cause of action"); Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 741-42 (3d Cir. 1990)
(acknowledging the negligence standard in a duty to warn case); Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d
284,289-90 (Iowa 1994) (same); Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 381 N.W.2d 503,508 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (citing Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616,622 (Minn. 1984)) (same), afftden banc, 395
N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986); Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (Ohio 1990) (same).
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998).
11. Id. (emphasis added).
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approach. 12 Again, the Third Restatement appears to have given its approval to this
replacement of strict liability by negligence. 3 According to the Third Restatement,
a product "is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design by the seller or other distributor."' 4
IV. LIABILITY THEORIES WITHOUT A DEFECT REQUIREMENT
Plaintiffs' lawyers have also shifted away from traditional theories based on
product defect and have begun to focus more on liability theories that do not require
proof of defect, which include misrepresentation, civil conspiracy and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, the malfunction
doctrine, and negligent marketing. 5
A. Misrepresentation
As Products Liability Law explains, "misrepresentation is the communication
of false or misleading information to another."' 6 The "classic" form of tortious
misrepresentation, commonly called deceit or fraud, 7 requires the defendant to
know that the factual statement made to the plaintiff is false, 8 and the defendant
must intend for it to deceive or mislead. 9 Some states also recognize negligent
misrepresentation.2 ° In these states, the defendant must negligently provide false
information instead of intentionally doing so. 2' Thus, under misrepresentation,
liability is based on false statements about the product and not on whether the
product is defective. In recent years, misrepresentation claims have figured
prominently in litigation against the manufacturers of inherently dangerous, but not
12. Wright v. Brooke Group, Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2002) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. n); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 185-86
(Mich. 1984).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b).
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. E.g., In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d 669, 673 (N.D. Ohio 2005)
("Among other theories of liability, the plaintiffs assert claims for strict liability, negligence, fraud, and
conspiracy."); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Kan. 1987) (noting the plaintiff alleged
civil conspiracy and fraud).
16. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 3.1, at 111.
17. Id.
18. Id. § 3.2, at 121.
19. Id. § 3.2, at 121-22.
20. Id. § 3.3, at 129-30 & nn.6-7.
21. E.g., Jimenez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 269 F.3d 439, 447 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing the
elements of negligent misrepresentation under South Carolina law); Maneely v. Gen. Motors Corp., 108
F.3d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1997) (listing the elements of negligent misrepresentation under California
law).
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defective, products such as cigarettes,22 fast food,23 and alcoholic beverages.24
Plaintiffs have also increasingly relied on misrepresentation in pharmaceutical cases
because of the difficulty of proving that pharmaceutical products are defective.2
5
B. Civil Conspiracy and RICO Violations
Civil conspiracy and RICO have become popular liability theories in recent
years.26 A civil conspiracy involves two or more persons who act together to
achieve an unlawful objective or to achieve a lawful objective in an unlawful
manner.27 A civil conspiracy is not a tort, and therefore, the plaintiff must prove the
existence of an underlying tort, such as fraud.28 However, a finding of civil
conspiracy increases liability by holding each defendant jointly liable for the all of
the consequences of all the conspirators' actions.29 According to Products Liability
Law, a civil conspiracy claim is not concerned with whether a product is defective,
but instead is based on the defendant's wrongful conduct.30 This theory is
particularly helpful to plaintiffs in suits against sellers of products, like cigarettes,
that may not be defective in and of themselves.3'
22. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 113 n.4 (discussing the prominent role of
fraudulent misrepresentation in tobacco litigation).
23. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512,524 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated inpart, 396
F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005) (addressing plaintiffs' claim of deceptive advertising),
24. Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co., 644 N.E.2d 731, 732 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (claiming
"fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation").
25. See, e.g., Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 232-36 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing
plaintiffs' fraudulent misrepresentation claim against pacemaker manufacturer); Miller v. Pfizer Inc.,
196 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1119-23 (D. Kan. 2002) (discussing plaintiffs' misrepresentation claims against
prescription drug manufacturer), affd, 356 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 2004); Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum,
970 P.2d 98, 110-11 (Nev. 1998) (alleging fraudulent concealment and fraudulent misrepresentation).
26. See generally PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 11.3, at 754-56 (discussing the use
of civil conspiracy in products liability actions); id. § 10.3, at 658-59 (addressing civil RICO claims
against tobacco companies).
27. Id § 10.3, at 754; see also Christian v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 951, 959
(D. Md. 2001) ("[T]he plaintiff must establish 'a meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement."'
(quoting Elecs. Store, Inc. v. Cellco P'ship, 732 A.2d 9980, 992 (Md. 1992))); Brenner v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 732 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 (App. Div. 2001) ("Rather, '[a]llegations of conspiracy are
permitted only to connect the actions of separate defendants with an otherwise actionable tort."'
(quoting Alexander & Alexander of N.Y., Inc. v. Fritzen, 503 N.E.2d 102, 103 (N.Y. 1986))); Anderson
v. Fortune Brands, Inc. (In re Kings County Tobacco Litig.), 723 N.Y.S.2d 304,307-08 (Sup. Ct. 2000)
(requiring a plaintiff prove "by clear and convincing evidence ... the existence of an agreement to
willfully fail to supply information" to allow a civil conspiracy claim in a products liability action for
failure to warn) (footnote omitted).
28. Brown ex rel. Estate of Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 506, 517 (D.N.J. 2002).
29. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 11.3, at 754.
30. See id.
31. See id. § 11.3, 754-55; see also Heam v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1096,
1117 (D. Ariz. 2003) (allowing plaintiffs' action against a cigarette manufacturer because the
"[p]laintiffs plead[ed] all necessary elements of a civil conspiracy"); Waterhouse v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 270 F. Supp. 2d 678, 685-86 (D. Md. 2003) (allowing a civil conspiracy claim based on
fraudulent representation).
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Products Liability Law also examines the RICO statute.32 RICO imposes
criminal and civil liability on any person who invests in an enterprise that has been
acquired through a pattern of racketeering activity.3 3 Although Congress originally
enacted RICO to prevent organized crime from infiltrating legitimate businesses,34
both federal and state governmental plaintiffs have used it against the tobacco
industry.35 For example, in United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. ,36 the United States
alleged that the tobacco companies withheld information about the health risks of
smoking and the addictive nature of nicotine, misled the public about the safety of
"low tar/low nicotine" cigarettes, suppressed research about the development of less
hazardous cigarettes, and manipulated nicotine levels in cigarettes. 37 By invoking
RICO, the government sidestepped the issue of whether cigarettes were "defective,"
and thus was able to focus instead on the bad conduct of the tobacco companies.38
C. The Malfunction Doctrine.
The malfunction doctrine39 as set forth in section 3 of the Third Restatement,
40
ultimately derives from the old negligence doctrine of res ipsa loquitur I Although
this liability theory does not expressly do away with the defect requirement, it does
allow plaintiffs to sidestep the defect requirement when circumstances indicate that
the product's failure-its "malfunction"-"most probably resulted from a
[manufacturing] defect. ' 42 Even before the malfunction doctrine was formally
incorporated into the Third Restatement, many courts already recognized the
doctrine in products liability cases. 3 The Third Restatement's endorsement of the
malfunction doctrine seems to further weaken the importance of the defect
requirement.
32. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 10.3, at 658-59.
33. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1964 (2000).
34. See Gramercy 222 Residents Corp. v. Gramercy Realty Assocs., 591 F. Supp. 1408, 1413
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590 (1981)); Bryce A. Jensen, Note,
From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond-A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries,
86 CORNELL L. REv. 1334, 1354 (2001).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(addressing the United States' civil claim against a tobacco company under RICO); Texas v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 969 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (addressing the State's civil claim against a
tobacco company under RICO).
36. 116 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2000).
37. Id. at 136-38.
38. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 10.3, at 658 & nn.95-96.
39. Id. § 6.5, at 409.
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 (1998).
41. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 6.5, at 409.
42. See id.
43. See, e.g., Marcus v. Anderson/Gore Homes, Inc., 498 So. 2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986); Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1152-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Farmer v. int'l
Harvester Co., 553 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Idaho 1976) (citations omitted); Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor
Corp., 686 P.2d 925, 928 (Nev. 1984); Harkins v. Calumet Realty Co., 614 A.2d 699, 705 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (citing Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 565 A.2d 751, 754-55 (Pa. 1989)).
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D. Negligent Marketing
Unlike traditional products liability theories, negligent marketing focuses on
the marketing practices of product sellers and not on whether the products they sell
are defective." This liability theory includes claims based on product design,
advertising or promotional activities that target high-risk consumers, and
inadequate supervision of distributors or retail sellers. 5 Most negligent marketing
cases have been concerned with non-defective firearms.46 Plaintiffs in these cases
have alleged that manufacturers designed their handguns in a way that would
appeal to criminals,47 or that manufacturers targeted their advertising at consumers
who were likely to commit violent crimes.48 Plaintiffs in such cases have often
claimed that handgun manufacturers marketed their products in a way that
facilitated the operation of illegal secondary markets for handguns in urban areas. 9
V. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
Federal statutes have regulated product safety for many years." Recently,
however, product manufacturers have begun to invoke principles of federal
preemption and constitutional law in order to avoid or limit their liability to
consumers for product-related injuries. For example, manufacturers have raised
federal preemption as a defense in cases where they have complied with federal
safety standards.5 ' Manufacturers have challenged large punitive damage awards
on due process grounds52 and have invoked the First Amendment right of free
44. See generally Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of Non-Defective Products: An
A nalysis and Critique of the Concept ofNegligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REV. 907, 913 (2002) ("[S]ince
negligent marketing focuses on the marketing process rather than whether the product is defective, it
allows parties who sue under this theory to sidestep the defect issue.").
45. Andrew Jay McClurg, The Tortious Marketing of Handguns: Strict Liability is Dead, Long
Live Negligence, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 777, 799-818 (1995).
46. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 10.3, at 663 & n.128.
47. E.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing the
plaintiffs' "claim that the manufacturers' indiscriminate marketing and distribution practices generated
an underground market in handguns, providing youths and violent criminals like the shooters in these
cases with easy access to the instruments they have used with lethal effect."), vacated sub nom.,
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
48. E.g., Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 121 (Cal. 2001) ("[P]laintiffs alleged, [the gun
manufacturer] 'acted negligently by manufacturing, marketing, and making available to the public"'
a handgun with a "'reputation as a weapon favored by criminals.').
49. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
50. For a discussion of federal product safety legislation, see Richard C. Ausness, The Case for
a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210, 1214-17 (1996).
51. PRODUCTs LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 14.4.
52. Id. § 18.7. See generally Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Tort Reform: Limiting
State Power to Articulate and Develop Tort Law-Defamation, Preemption andPunitive Damages, 74
U. CIN. L. REV. 1189, 1243-57 (2006) (discussing due process challenges to punitive damage awards
in products liability cases).
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expression to avoid liability for the sale of materials that contain violent53 or
sexually explicit content.54
A. Federal Preemption
As Professor Owen observes, "the defense of federal preemption in recent years
has grown from little more than a blip on the radar screen to one of the most
powerful defenses in all of products liability law."55 The preemption doctrine
overrides state statutes, administrative regulations, and common law doctrines that
conflict with federal law.56 Congress or federal administrative agencies, when
authorized by Congress, can expressly preempt state law, including the law of
products liability.57 In addition, a state's products liability law may be superseded
by implied preemption.58 Implied preemption occurs when a federal regulatory
scheme is so pervasive that it "occupies the field" and thereby excludes any form
of state regulation. 59 Alternatively, state laws, including common law rules, are
impliedly preempted when they conflict with federal regulatory provisions.6 °
Products Liability Law provides an excellent overview of the Supreme Court's
recent preemption jurisprudence, 6' including Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,62
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,63 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. ,64 Medtronic
v. Lohr,65 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'Legal Committee,66 and Sprietsma v. Mercury
Marine.67 Professor Owen's treatise also discusses a number of lower court
preemption cases involving the Consumer Product Safety Act and the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA). 68 Although the courts have not been entirely
consistent in their treatment of preemption, it is clear that the preemption doctrine
has caused federal safety standards to displace substantial areas of state products
liability law.
53. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 1997).
54. Galligan, supra note 52, at 1218-20.
55. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 14.4, at 895.
56. Id. § 14.4, at 896-97.
57. Id. § 14.4, at 897-98 & n.14.
58. Id. § 14.4, at 897.
59. Id. § 14.4, at 898-99.
60. Id.
61. See id. § 14.4, at 904-16.
62. 505 U.S. 504, 508, 530-31 (1992) (cigarette labeling).
63. 514 U.S. 280, 283 (1995) (anti-lock brakes).
64. 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000) (airbags).
65. 518 U.S. 470, 474, 503 (1996) (medical devices).
66. 531 U.S. 341, 343-44 (2001) (medical devices).
67. 537 U.S. 51, 54, 70 (2002) (boat propeller guards).
68. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 14.4, at 917-19.
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B. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages may be awarded to a plaintiff in a civil action, in addition to
compensatory damages, when the defendant is found to have acted maliciously or
in flagrant violation of the plaintiff's rights.69 In recent years, punitive damages
have been awarded in a wide range of products liability cases, and some of these
awards have been quite large.7° As Professor Owen points out, this trend has led
product manufacturers to seek constitutional protection against excessive or
otherwise improper punitive damages awards.7' Although the Court rejected an
excessive fines challenge to a punitive damages award in Browning-Ferris
Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,72 it held in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip73 that the Due Process clause requires punitive damages to
be "reasonable in their amount and rational in light of their purpose to
punish . . . and ... deter., 74 The Court adhered to this approach in subsequent
cases, 75 culminating in State Farm MutualA utomobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell. 
76
In that case, the Court provided three criteria or "guideposts" for determining
whether a punitive damage award is excessive on due process grounds.77 Professor
Owen concludes "it is clear for now that the Supreme Court takes seriously the idea
that the due process clause limits the size of punitive awards, a development that
is beginning to ripple through punitive damages awards in products liability
cases."
78
C. First Amendment Issues
Products liability claims against producers of books, songs, movies, and video
games are becoming increasingly common.79 While some of these cases are
concerned with books that publish inaccurate information,8" others involve
69. Id. § 18.1, at 1120-21.
70. Id. § 18.1, at 1129.
71. Id. § 18.7, at 1216-17.
72. 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989).
73. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
74. Id. at 21.
75. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,436 n.9 (2001); BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420-21
(1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,458 (1993) (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S.
at 18).
76. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
77. Id. at 1418 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575); PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 18.7,
at 1223-25.
78. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 18.7, at 1231-32.
79. Id § 16.8, at 1057.
80. E.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991) (addressing a claim
against a book publisher for incorrect information on identifying mushrooms); Lewin v. McCreight, 655
F. Supp. 282,283 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("How To" book); Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publ'g, Inc., 833
P.2d 70, 73 (Haw. 1992) (travel guide).
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publications that facilitate violent acts,8 1 result in imitative violence,81 or inspire
readers, listeners, or viewers to commit violent or criminal acts.s3 In Rice v. Paladin
Enterprises, Inc.,84 a facilitation case, the court refused to find that an instruction
manual for aspiring hit men was constitutionally protected against tort actions
brought by the relatives of one of the hit man's victims.85
In many other cases, however, publishers have successfully argued that the
First Amendment limits tort actions based on the content of their products.86 First,
courts have concluded that the contents of books, songs, movies, and even video
games are forms of expression." Second, courts have employed Brandenburg v.
Ohio's 81 incitement analysis to determine whether such expression is
constitutionally protected.89 Under this approach, speech that inspires violence is
constitutionally protected unless the speaker explicitly advocates an unlawful act
and intends to incite or produce the act; there is a high likelihood that the act will
occur; and the occurrence of the act is imminent.9° This constitutional standard is
strict enough to effectively remove state law in this area of products liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
Products Liability Law comprehensively examines the many changes that have
transformed this field in recent years, including the triumph of negligence over
strict liability, the abandonment of defect as a core concept of products liability, and
the federalization of large areas of state products liability law. Beyond that,
Products Liability Law offers something for everyone who has an interest in this
fascinating and ever-changing area of law. Students will like the treatise's attention
to historical development and context. They will also benefit from the clarity of its
81. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 1997); Braun v. Soldier of Fortune
Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11 th Cir. 1992).
82. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018-19 (5th Cir. 1987); Sakon v. Pepsico,
Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. 1989) (citation omitted); DeFilippo v. NBC, Inc., 446 A.2d 1036,
1037-38 (R.I. 1982).
83. Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. S upp. 1144, 1145 (M.D. Ga. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d 1084 (1 th
Cir. 1992); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
84. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
85. Id. at 249-50.
86. See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Application of Product Liability Principles to
Publishers of Violent or Sexually Explicit Material, 52 FLA. L. REV. 603, 641-58 (2000) (addressing
the First Amendment protections afforded publishers in products liability actions).
87. See Paul E. Salamanca, Video Games as a Protected Form of Expression, 40 GA. L. REV. 153,
159, 161-62, 167 n.66, 173-87 (2005).
88. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
89. Rice, 128 F.3d 233, 249 (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447); Waller v. Osbourne, 763
F. Supp. 1144,1150 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (same), aff'd, 958 F.2d 1084 (11 th Cir. 1992); Herceg v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (same); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr.
187, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (same); Olivia N. v. NBC, Inc., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 893 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) (same); Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681, 690 (same).
90. Andrew B. Sims, Tort Liability for Physical Injuries Allegedly Resultingfrom Media Speech:
A Comprehensive First Amendment Approach, 34 ARIz. L. REV. 231, 256 (1992).
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analysis of difficult doctrinal issues. In addition, students will appreciate Products
Liability Law's compact size and logical organization. In addition to these features,
practicing attorneys will findProductsLiabilityLawuseful because it is completely
current, provides thorough coverage of every area ofproducts liability law, contains
voluminous citations to relevant cases and statutes, and treats controversial issues
honestly and objectively. Finally, courts and legal scholars will appreciate the depth
of Professor Owen's research and scholarship, as well as his treatment of novel
topics in products liability law. In conclusion, Products Liability Law is a "must
read" for students, practitioners, courts, and legal scholars alike.
